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[1691] 
RICO’s Extraterritoriality After Morrison: 
Where Should We Go From Here? 
Anneka Huntley* 
In 2010 the Supreme Court addressed the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities 
law in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., and held that U.S. laws could not be 
applied to stocks bought and sold on foreign markets. The holding also invalidated the 
“conduct and effects” test that lower courts had used to assess the extraterritoriality of 
securities laws, and mandated that courts look to a statute’s focus to determine if 
Congress intended the law to apply abroad. Prior to Morrison, courts had also used the 
conduct and effects test to assess the extraterritorial application of the Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Since the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, lower courts have struggled to identify RICO’s focus and formulate a new test 
for the extraterritorial application of RICO. Three approaches have emerged: the 
enterprise approach, the “predicate acts” approach, and the “pattern of activity” 
approach. 
 
This Note argues that the enterprise approach is the best approach. This Note 
discusses the history of the conduct and effects test in RICO jurisprudence, the 
landmark Supreme Court decision in Morrison, and the resulting lower court 
confusion regarding extraterritorial applications of RICO. This Note then illuminates 
the flaws in the predicate acts and pattern of activity approaches, and argues that the 
enterprise approach is the clearest, most easily applicable approach and should thus 
be adopted by lower courts.  
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Introduction 
Securities law scholars widely considered the 2010 Supreme Court 
ruling in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. to be game-changer 
in American securities law jurisprudence.1 Less obvious at the time, 
perhaps, was the upheaval the ruling would later cause in cases involving 
the extraterritorial application of a completely different area of law: the 
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). 
RICO is a set of federal statutes designed to create criminal and civil 
liability for the act of organizing a crime, even if the actor never took 
part in the crime itself.2 RICO has clear domestic applications, but the 
statute itself is silent as to any extraterritorial application. Before 
 
 1. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 560 U.S. 247 (2010). See, e.g., Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise 
Lost: § 10(b) after Morrison v. Australia National Bank, 11 Chi. J. Int’l L. 343 (2011); George T. 
Conway III, Extraterritoriality’s Watchdog After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 105 Am. Soc’y 
Int’l L. Proc. 394 (2011); Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. Australia National Bank and the Future of 
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 537 (2011). 
 2. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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Morrison, courts had seemed to settle on the “conduct and effects” test 
to determine when RICO could be applied to extraterritorial acts.3 
Morrison specifically invalidated that test and the case holdings that 
created the test.4 Because RICO jurisprudence borrows heavily from 
securities jurisprudence, and it borrowed the conduct and effects test in 
particular, the ruling in Morrison threw courts into turmoil over how to 
apply RICO to enterprises and transactions that occur abroad. The 
Morrison ruling also reaffirmed the longstanding presumption against 
extraterritoriality.5 The presumption holds that statutes that do not say 
they apply abroad will be assumed to have no foreign application.6 
Accordingly, a statute will only have extraterritorial reach if Congress 
specifically states that it intends for the statute to be applied to acts that 
occur outside of the United States.7 
RICO itself is silent as to its extraterritorial application. With the 
conduct and effects test invalidated in Morrison, courts have struggled to 
craft a test for determining the location of a RICO scheme (and thus, 
determining whether U.S. courts have jurisdiction) that avoids any 
foreign application. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison mandates 
that courts look to a statute’s “focus” to determine extraterritorial 
application.8 The RICO statute names two foci: “enterprises” and 
“patterns of activity.”9 A third focus on “predicate acts” has developed in 
the case law.10 Thus, three approaches have emerged to assist courts in 
determining the extraterritorial reach of RICO: (1) the enterprise 
approach, using the location where defendants crafted the RICO 
scheme; (2) the “predicate acts” approach, using the location of the acts; 
and (3) the “pattern of activity” approach, considering the set of actions 
as whole, including acts occurring abroad. The enterprise approach is 
also sometimes coupled with the “nerve center” test, borrowed from 
corporate law,11 which narrows the criteria for determining the location 
of a RICO scheme to where the scheme is directed, controlled, and 
coordinated.12 
 
 3. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1968); Leasco Data Processing Equip. 
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333–39 (2d Cir. 1972); Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 124 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
 4. Morrison, 560 U.S. at 253–54. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 255. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 266. 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012). 
 10. CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Colo. 2011). 
 11. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). 
 12. Id. at *5–6. 
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The Ninth Circuit adopted the pattern of activity approach in the 
beginning of 2013.13 This is the only test adopted by an appellate court 
thus far. However, it is also the least clear and the most difficult to apply 
by lower courts. The pattern of activity approach ignores the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and crafts a test that instead 
favors extraterritoriality more than any other test. However, the 
predicate acts approach is similarly unworkable because it relies on a re-
framed version of the conduct and effects test invalidated in Morrison. 
The predicate acts approach also ignores the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. This Note argues that the enterprise approach is the 
clearest and most easily applicable test for extraterritorial application of 
RICO because it is the test most likely to produce predictable results, it 
has wider support among the courts than any other test, and it is in 
keeping with both the presumption against extraterritoriality and 
Congress’s focus on domesticity in RICO schemes. 
Part I of this Note addresses the extraterritorial application of 
RICO before Morrison. Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of the conduct and effects test and the Court’s new emphasis 
on the focus of federal statutes. Part III addresses judicial attempts to 
craft a new test for RICO extraterritoriality with the enterprise 
approach, the predicate acts approach, and the Ninth Circuit’s pattern of 
activity approach. Finally, Part IV explains why the enterprise approach 
is the best of the three tests and should be adopted in the future. 
I.  Extraterritorial Application of RICO Before MORRISON 
RICO is a federal law designed to punish the heads of criminal 
organizations who order their subordinates to commit crimes.14 Before 
the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Morrison, most courts used a conduct 
and effects test crafted by the Second Circuit to determine whether 
American securities statutes could be applied to actions that occurred 
abroad.15 Later courts considering RICO’s extraterritorial reach then 
borrowed the conduct and effects test from securities jurisprudence and 
applied it to RICO cases.16 
 
 13. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 14. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 15. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he tests used to assess the 
extraterritorial application of the securities laws provide useful guidelines for evaluating whether the 
jurisdictional minimum exists . . . .”); see, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977); Kauthar 
SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998); Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 
424–25 (9th Cir. 1983); Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 16. See N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996); Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663; 
Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 
2008); Robinson v. TCI/U.S. W. Commc’n Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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A. A Note on the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act 
Congress originally passed RICO in 1970 to target and punish the 
leaders of criminal organizations who ordered crimes to be committed 
but never took part in the crimes themselves.17 RICO prohibits 
“patterns”18 of criminal activity and criminalizes a specific and 
articulated set of actions, with a special focus on organized crime.19 In 
order for crimes to be punishable under RICO, the offender must 
commit at least two crimes from RICO’s defined list of thirty-five crimes, 
and the crimes must form a pattern of activity.20 In other words, two 
unrelated or sporadic criminal acts do not fall under the RICO 
umbrella.21 RICO further requires that the crimes be committed as part 
of an “enterprise,”22 meaning an “individual, partnership, corporation, 
[or] any union or group of individuals”23 that share a common purpose 
and at least some continuity of structure or personnel.24 Because 
Congress mandated that RICO’s terms be “construed liberally,”25 courts 
have considerable leeway to interpret the meaning of the word 
“enterprise” and have held that a broad variety of associations qualify as 
enterprises under RICO.26 RICO’s drafters originally intended the act to 
be used to punish mob bosses, but it has been used expansively to pursue 
other organizations—such as the tobacco industry,27 the Catholic Church 
 
 17. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012); Parness, 503 F.2d at 439. 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2012). 
 19. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974). 
 20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1962 (2012). The prohibited activities list includes crimes such as murder, 
robbery, theft, extortion, embezzlement, counterfeiting, money laundering, drug trafficking, and fraud, 
and receiving any income or profits from any of those acts. Id. In order to form a pattern of activity, 
the acts must also be related in some way and must establish a threat of continuing activity; thus, the 
courts look to the factor of “continuity plus relationship” in the acts. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 
473 U.S. 479, 528 (1985) 
 21. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14; H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). 
 22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)–(c) (2012). 
 23. Id. § 1961(4). 
 24. Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 25. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 942. 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 425 (6th Cir. 2000) (Cosa Nostra organized 
crime family); United States v. Torres, 191 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 1999) (enforcers in a street gang who 
collected drug debts); United States v. Richardson, 167 F.3d 621, 625 (group of armed robbers 
convicted of a series of assaults and robberies); Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1353 (8th Cir. 
1997) (defendant’s bankruptcy estate that defendant attempted to use to defraud his judgment 
creditor); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1116 (6th Cir. 1985) (judge and bag-men who 
organized kickbacks for judicial favors); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 
1983) (college basketball game fixers). 
 27. United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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in its child sexual abuse scandal,28 and pro-life organizations that 
physically blocked access to abortion clinics.29 
Nothing in the text of RICO states whether Congress intended the 
statute to have extraterritorial application—that is, whether RICO 
applies to acts or conduct occurring outside of the United States.30 The 
Supreme Court has made clear that where there is no express 
extraterritorial intent in the text of a statute, lower courts are to construe 
the statute as having no extraterritorial effect.31 According to the Court, 
if Congress intends a U.S. law to apply extraterritorially, it must say so 
explicitly; otherwise, the statute will only be applicable to acts occurring 
in the United States.32 If Congress states that a law applies outside the 
United States, courts will apply that law according to its terms, even 
when the law violates international law.33 However, “[i]t is a 
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, 
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”34 As the Supreme Court 
asserted in Morrison, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.”35 
B.  The Conduct and Effects Test 
Before the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Morrison, courts 
determined RICO’s extraterritorial reach differently.36 Some courts held 
that RICO was not applicable extraterritorially at all.37 A majority of 
 
 28. Hall v. Tressic, 381 F. Supp. 2d 101 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Amended Complaint, Hoatson v. N.Y. 
Archdiocese, No. 05-CV-10467, 2006 WL 548198 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2006); Herakovic v. Catholic 
Diocese of Cleveland, No. 85467, 2005 WL 3007145 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2005); Doe v. 
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 852 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio 2004). 
 29. Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994). 
 30. N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 31. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 560 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
 32. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 33. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”); 
The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 421 (1815) (U.S. courts are bound by the “law of nations” unless the 
government “manifests its will” to disregard them “by passing an act of Congress.”). For a concise 
discussion of how the two concepts relate to each other, see United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 93 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
 34. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284 (1949)). 
 35. Morrison, 560 U.S. at 255. 
 36. Compare Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 357 (D. Or. 1991) (“[T]he presumption 
against extraterritorial application of federal statutes has not been overcome by clearly expressed 
congressional intent within the RICO statutes or legislative history.”), with United States v. Noriega, 
746 F. Supp. 1506, 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“The Act thus permits no inference that it was intended to 
apply only to conduct within the United States. Such a narrow construction would frustrate RICO’s 
purpose . . . .”). 
 37. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. at 357. 
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courts that considered the issue, however, applied a “conduct and 
effects” test borrowed from securities jurisprudence.38 
The conduct and effects test was crafted by the Second Circuit, first 
as two distinct tests in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook39 and Leasco Data 
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,40 which were later combined in 
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC.41 The test was then imported into RICO 
jurisprudence in the Second Circuit in North South Finance Corp. v. Al-
Turki,42 in the Ninth Circuit in Poulos v. Caesars World Inc.,43 and in the 
Eleventh Circuit in Liquidation Commission of Banco Intercontinental 
SA v. Renta.44 
1. The Conduct and Effects Tests in the Second Circuit’s Securities 
Jurisprudence 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the Second Circuit 
developed two distinct conducts and effects tests in two groundbreaking 
cases.45 The Second Circuit later combined these tests into one new 
test.46 Because of its clarity and ease of use, the Second Circuit and other 
courts used the new test to assess the extraterritorial reach of American 
securities law. 
In 1968, the Second Circuit held in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook that 
the Securities Exchange Act (“SEA”) could be applied to foreign 
transactions if the effect of those transactions was felt in the United 
States.47 In Schoenbaum, the court considered a claim under section 
10(b) of the SEA that American shareholders were defrauded during an 
international sale of stock in a Canadian company.48 The court held that 
 
 38. N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1052 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering the new test, but 
ultimately choosing not apply it); Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 
F.3d 1339, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying the conduct test to a Florida businessman’s fraud 
perpetrated against a Dominican bank); Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 
2004) (applying the conduct and effects test to casinos aboard cruise ships in international waters); 
Robinson v. TCI/U.S. W. Commc’ns Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying conduct test to 
American company’s claim that it was defrauded during the sale of an English company); Adhikari v. 
Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 689 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (applying the conduct and effects test to 
a human trafficking scheme). 
 39. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 40. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333–39 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 41. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 42. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1052. 
 43. Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663. 
 44. Renta, 530 F.3d at 1351–52. 
 45. Leasco, 468 F.3d at 1333–39 (establishing the conduct test for extraterritorial application of 
RICO; if the conduct occurred in the United States, U.S. law applied); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 
F.2d 200, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1972) (establishing the effects test for extraterritorial application of RICO; if 
the effects were felt in the United States, U.S. law applied). 
 46. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122. 
 47. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206. 
 48. Id. at 205–06. 
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the presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply because the 
Canadian company traded its stocks on the American stock exchange, 
injuring American investors.49 U.S. securities law applied because the 
investors felt the effects of the foreign transaction in the United States.50 
In 1972, the Second Circuit held in Leasco Data Processing 
Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell that American securities law applied if the 
conduct in question occurred in the United States.51 There, the British 
defendants allegedly committed fraud in the sale of shares of a British 
company to a U.S.-based corporation.52 The court held that, although the 
transaction occurred on a foreign stock exchange and the investors did 
not feel any effects inside the United States, domestic law applied 
because a substantial amount of the misrepresentations took place inside 
the United States.53 Thus, if the misconduct occurs in the United States, 
the behavior is subject to American law.54 
In 1995, the Second Circuit expressly combined the two 
aforementioned tests in Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC.55 The court 
considered whether the SEA applied to fraud allegedly occurring during 
the sale of shares of a British company, Lep, to other overseas 
companies.56 Lep’s shares traded partly on British stock exchanges and 
partly on NASDAQ,57 and U.S. citizens in Connecticut allegedly made 
some of the misrepresentations.58 The court stated: “There is no 
requirement that these two tests be applied separately and distinctly 
from each other. Indeed, an admixture or combination of the two often 
gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States 
involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American 
court.”59 The court held that a “sufficient combination of ingredients of 
the conduct and effects tests is present in the instant case to justify the 
exercise of jurisdiction.”60 As the Supreme Court would later note in 
Morrison, the combined conduct and effects test was not necessarily 
“easy to administer” and sometimes resulted in uneven application.61 
Despite this later observation, courts embraced the Second Circuit’s 
 
 49. Id. at 206. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Leasco, 468 F.3d at 1334–35. 
 52. Id. at 1330. The court left unresolved the question of whether the American company was, in 
reality, owned and controlled by a Dutch company. 
 53. Id. at 1334–35. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 56. Id. at 120–21. 
 57. Id. at 120. 
 58. Id. at 121. 
 59. Id. at 122. 
 60. Id. at 124. 
 61. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 258 (2010). 
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approach because it provided guidance in what was otherwise a very 
difficult field.62 
2. Lower Courts Apply the “Conduct and Effects” Test to RICO 
Cases 
As previously noted, RICO extraterritoriality jurisprudence 
borrows heavily from securities law jurisprudence.63 Commentators have 
noted that the tests used in SEA cases are easily transferable to RICO 
cases because the nature and purpose of the two statutes are similar.64 
Thus, RICO cases after Itoba attempted to borrow its combined conduct 
and effects test. In 1996, the Second Circuit first considered the 
combined conduct and effects tests in the RICO context in North South 
Finance Corp. v. Al-Turki.65 In Al-Turki, the Second Circuit ultimately 
sidestepped the issue, affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s claim on jurisdictional grounds without affirming the court’s 
use of the conduct and effects test.66 According to the court, the 
defendants in Al-Turki had decidedly attenuated links to the United 
States, and the court declined to extend U.S. jurisdiction over them.67 
The court noted the extremely unsettled nature of this area of the law: 
“specifying the test for the extraterritorial application of RICO is 
delicate work. That work has not been done, [and] we need not do it 
now.”68 
The Ninth Circuit used the conduct and effects test in the RICO 
context in 2004 in Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc.69 There, the court 
assessed whether RICO applied to a line of cruise ships—operating in 
 
 62. See SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 
1991); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1977); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 
(7th Cir. 1998); Cont’l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 415 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 63. N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Although there is little 
caselaw in this circuit regarding the extraterritorial application of RICO, guidance is furnished by 
precedents concerning subject matter jurisdiction for international securities transactions and antitrust 
matters.” (citation omitted)). 
 64. Kristen Neller, Extraterritorial Application of RICO: Protecting U.S. Markets in a Global 
Economy, 14 Mich. J. Int’l L. 357, 377 (1993) (“[T]he purpose behind the enactment of RICO is 
comparable to that of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act. Congress adopted Rule 10b-5 to 
combat securities fraud and protect American investors and the market as a whole, while RICO was 
enacted to combat racketeering activity and protect American businesses and industry. For each 
statute, the prohibited activity’s impact on the U.S. economy as a whole was the primary concern of 
Congress.”); but cf. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1052 (“We therefore do not assume that congressional intent 
in enacting RICO justifies a similar approach to the statute’s foreign application.”). 
 65. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1052. 
 66. Id. at 1052–53. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1052. 
 69. Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663–64 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit also 
used the conduct and effects test in Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 76 F.3d 287, 292 (9th Cir. 1996), and 
Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 961 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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both U.S. and international waters—that had been accused of RICO 
violations in their onboard casinos.70 The court held that RICO applied 
because the activities of the defendants took place substantially within 
the United States, and affected U.S. citizens and commerce.71 After the 
Supreme Court abrogated the conduct and effects test used in 
Schoenbaum, Leasco, and Itoba with its Morrison decision, the Ninth 
Circuit crafted a new and confusing test for the extraterritorial 
application of RICO that will be difficult for lower courts to apply.72 
More recently, in 2008, the Eleventh Circuit considered the conduct 
and effects test in the RICO context in Liquidation Commission of 
Banco Intercontinental SA v. Renta.73 The court considered the 
extraterritoriality of RICO as a matter of first impression for that 
Circuit.74 Borrowing from Al-Turki and Poulos, the Renta court stated 
that RICO would apply extraterritorially “if conduct material to the 
completion of the racketeering occurs in the United States, or if 
significant effects of the racketeering are felt here.”75 The court held that 
“[s]ignificant amounts” of the defendants’ conduct in “furtherance of the 
RICO conspiracy,” though aimed at defrauding banks in the Dominican 
Republic, had occurred inside the United States.76 
A majority of courts that considered RICO’s extraterritoriality 
before Morrison applied the conduct and effects test.77 Like the conduct 
and effects test in securities law, the test provided some guidance in a 
largely unsettled area of the law.78 Without this guidance, questions of 
RICO’s extraterritoriality became muddy questions of policy.79 
II.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence Changes the Landscape of 
RICO Extraterritoriality 
The Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Morrison significantly changed 
the landscape of SEA extraterritoriality jurisprudence. There, the Court 
expressly abrogated the Second Circuit’s holdings in Schoenbaum, 
Leasco, and Itoba,80 the three cases that created the combined conduct 
 
 70. Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663–64. 
 71. Id. The claim was dismissed on other grounds. Id. at 672. 
 72. See infra Part III.C. 
 73. Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 74. Id. at 1351. 
 75. Id. at 1351–52. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 689 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Renta, 530 
F.3d at 1352; Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663; Robinson v. TCI/U.S. W. Commc’n Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th 
Cir. 1997); N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1052 (2d Cir. 1996). A small number of courts 
considering the issue chose not use the test. See Doe I v. State of Isr., 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 114–16 
(D.D.C. 2005); Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 357 (D. Or. 1991). 
 78. Renta, 530 F.3d at 1531; Al-Turki, 100 F.3d at 1052. 
 79. Robinson, 117 F.3d at 907; Doe I, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 116; Jose, 801 F. Supp. at 354. 
 80. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 257–58, 266 (2010). 
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and effects test used in securities jurisprudence.81 The Morrison ruling 
created a new emphasis on the “focus” of a statute.82 Because RICO 
cases also relied on the conduct and effects tests, the Morrison ruling 
threw the tests for extraterritorial application of RICO into flux, forcing 
courts to look to Congress’s “focus” in crafting RICO. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Ruling and Emphasis on Focus in MORRISON 
V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD. 
In Morrison, the Supreme Court abrogated the tests previously used 
in SEA extraterritoriality cases, instead mandating that courts look to 
the focus of a statute when determining whether Congress intended the 
law to apply to activities that occurred abroad. The Court considered the 
extraterritorial reach of American securities law in a case concerning 
fraud committed during the international sale of an American 
company.83 National, an Australian bank, purchased Homeside Lending, 
a U.S. company, to the eventual detriment of Australian shareholders of 
National. Homeside was a mortgage service company based in Florida.84 
Mortgage companies like Homeside can generate a substantial revenue 
stream from mortgage service fees.85 The estimated value of that income 
stream is dependent on how likely mortgagers are to pay off their loans 
on or ahead of schedule.86 Homeside used income predictions from the 
mortgage accounts it serviced to assess the value of the accounts, and in 
turn to assess its own value as a company.87 When National purchased 
Homeside in 1998, the estimated value of Homeside appeared in 
National’s financial statements as well as in public statements made by 
National, which its Australian shareholders used to make investing 
decisions.88 In 2001, National announced that it was writing down89 the 
value of Homeside by 2.2 billion dollars, causing the price of its stock to 
fall.90 
 
 81. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.3d 1326, 1333–39 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(establishing the conduct test for extraterritorial application of RICO); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 
F.2d 200, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1968) (establishing the effects test for extraterritorial application of RICO); 
Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (expressly combining the two tests). 
 82. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. 
 83. Id. at 251–52. 
 84. Id. at 251. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. A write down is a method of accounting where an asset’s book value is revised downward to 
reflect a new market value less than the previous estimated book value. The amount by which a 
company reduces the book value of an asset will be charged against its earnings as a loss or expense. 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1609 (6th ed. 1990). 
 90. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 251–52. 
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Petitioners, all Australian shareholders in National, brought a 
complaint in U.S. court against Homeside and National.91 Petitioners 
sued under section 10(b) of the SEA and SEC rule 10b-5,92 which 
protects investors from fraud or misrepresentations made in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security.93 The complaint alleged that 
Homeside purposefully manipulated the financial models it used to 
predict the likelihood of early mortgage payments, making the rates of 
early repayment “unrealistically low” and inflating the total value of 
Homeside Lending, and its parent company National.94 Thus, Homeside 
and National allegedly lied to and defrauded its Australian investors.95 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether 
American securities law covers fraud in transactions made on Australian 
stock exchanges that harm only Australian shareholders.96 
The Supreme Court held that the SEA only applies to stock 
transactions on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in other 
securities.97 The Court first reaffirmed the presumption against 
extraterritoriality,98 stressing Congress’s focus on domestic rather than 
foreign affairs.99 Interpreting the text of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the 
Court concluded that nothing indicated that Congress meant them to 
apply abroad.100 The Court then gutted the Second Circuit’s previous 
securities jurisprudence.101 The Court stated that the circuit had 
continually ignored the presumption against extraterritoriality, instead 
presuming to “‘discern’ whether Congress would have wanted [its] 
statute[s] to apply” in a given situation.102 The Court further stated that 
the circuit “produced a collection of tests” for divining congressional 
intent that are “complex in formulation and unpredictable in 
application”103 and that this “demonstrate[d] the wisdom of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.”104 In particular, the Court 
derided the Second Circuit’s conduct and effects tests (both separately 
and combined),105 and the resulting extraterritorial application of U.S. 
securities law to fraudulent schemes that occurred abroad, which other 
 
 91. Id. at 252. 
 92. Id. 
 93. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010); 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2014). 
 94. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 252. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 273. 
 98. Id. at 248 (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”). 
 99. Id. at 260–61. 
 100. Id. at 248. 
 101. Id. at 255. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 255–56. 
 104. Id. at 261. 
 105. Id. at 257–58. 
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circuits had subsequently followed.106 The Court stated, “[u]sing 
congressional silence as a justification for judge-made rules violates the 
traditional principle that silence means no extraterritorial application.”107 
In response to petitioner’s argument that U.S. citizens made the 
misrepresentations in the United States, the Court looked to the “focus” 
of the SEA, which it stated was “not upon the place where the deception 
originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United 
States,” essentially the securities transactions affected by the deceitful 
conduct.108 Thus, “only transactions in securities listed on domestic 
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities” fall under the 
purview of the SEA.109 According to the Court, if the purchase and sale 
of the affected securities is not in the United States, then the Exchange 
Act does not apply.110 In this case, while the misrepresentations occurred 
in Florida, the affected transactions took place abroad.111 Thus, because 
the SEA’s focus is domestic, it did not apply.112 Accordingly, the Court 
dismissed the claim.113 
B. How the “Focus” Test Affects RICO Jurisprudence 
The Court’s emphasis on Congress’s “focus” when crafting 
legislation is not new,114 but the affirmation of the importance of 
legislative focus has far reaching implications.115 The focus test requires a 
court to determine a statute’s focus by deciding what Congress intended 
the statute to accomplish when it created it.116 Before Morrison, the 
Court looked at focus when assessing the extraterritoriality of U.S. 
employment laws in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co.117 and 
concluded that Congress meant for Title VII to have a “purely domestic 
focus”; thus, it did not apply abroad.118 In the RICO context, courts were 
forced to determine the congressionally intended focus of RICO. 
However, RICO jurisprudence—and the consideration of RICO’s 
 
 106. Id. at 259. 
 107. Id. at 261; see John D. Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for A New 
U.S. Jurisprudence With Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provisions of 
the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 477, 492–493 (1997). 
 108. Morrison, 560 U.S. at 266. 
 109. Id. at 267. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 251–53. 
 112. Id. at 273. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See E.E.O.C v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 
U.S. 281, 283 (1949). 
 115. Patricia A. Leonard & Gerardo J. Rodriguez-Albizu, Do Extraterritorial RICO Claims Still 
Exist in a Post-Morrison World?, 59 Fed. Law. 60, 60–61 (Oct./Nov. 2012). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255. 
 118. Id. 
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extraterritoriality—has always borrowed heavily from securities 
jurisprudence.119 As noted, courts generally used the conduct and effects 
test.120 After Morrison, courts have struggled to craft a new test for 
RICO applicability abroad. Any new test for RICO, according to 
Morrison, must incorporate what Congress thought the focus of the law 
was when they crafted it.121 Prior to Morrison, courts identified three 
different, possibly overlapping, foci for RICO: the enterprise, the pattern 
of activity, and organized crime.122 
Section 1962 of the RICO statute names two foci: “enterprise[s]” 
and “patterns of activity.”123 The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. 
Neapolitan, stated that “[t]he central role of the concept of enterprise 
under RICO cannot be overstated.”124 The Supreme Court seemed to 
affirm the importance of a “pattern of activity” in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. 
Imrex Co., Inc.125 The Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s complaint and remanded the case, highlighting the need for 
future plaintiffs to show a “pattern of racketeering activity.”126 In H.J. 
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., the Supreme Court also clearly 
stated that RICO’s third focus is organized crime.127 The Court stated 
that Congress enacted RICO due to “the perceived need to combat 
organized crime,”128 and also noted that “although it had organized 
crime as its focus, [it] was not limited in application to organized 
crime.”129 As previously noted, no matter what Congress intended the 
focus of RICO to be, the presumption against extraterritoriality still 
applies because the statute is silent as to its extraterritorial application.130 
A claimant will need to overcome that presumption for RICO ever to 
apply to acts or effects felt abroad. 
 
 119. N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996); Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 
379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004); Neller, supra note 64, at 377–78. 
 120. See supra Part II.A. 
 121. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 560 U.S. 241, 266 (2010). 
 122. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir. 1986); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 
473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989). 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012). 
 124. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d at 500. 
 125. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237. 
 128. Id. at 248. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 560 U.S. 241, 255 (2010). 
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III.  The Extraterritoriality of RICO After  
the Ruling in MORRISON 
U.S. district courts have struggled to determine the true focus of 
RICO, and how it should be applied to acts and effects felt abroad.131 
Courts have taken two approaches: the “enterprise” approach, and the 
“predicate acts” approach. Both approaches leave RICO with almost no 
extraterritorial application. The enterprise approach focuses on the 
location of the enterprise, or where the “brains” of the operation are 
located.132 The predicate acts approach focuses on where the defendants 
carried out the acts and activities prohibited by RICO.133 
A. The “Enterprise” Approach 
The enterprise approach to the extraterritorial application of RICO 
was crafted by a New York district court, and lower courts subsequently 
applied the approach in Washington D.C., Florida, Pennsylvania, and 
California. Shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, the 
Southern District of New York considered RICO’s extraterritoriality in 
Cedeño v. Intech Group, Inc.134 The plaintiff, a Venezuelan citizen, 
brought suit under RICO against a group of Venezuelan defendants, 
alleging that they used U.S.-based banks in a money laundering scheme 
to hold, move, and conceal the monetary fruits of fraud, extortion, and 
private abuse of public authority.135 The scheme’s only connection with 
the United States was the passing of funds through American banks.136 
The court, specifically noting Morrison’s repudiation of the Second 
Circuit’s conduct and effects test, looked to the focus of RICO to 
determine whether Congress meant for it to apply abroad.137 The court 
concluded that the focus of RICO is indeed on an enterprise of 
racketeering activity, as “it is these [enterprises] that the statute labels 
the ‘Prohibited activities.’”138 The court reasoned that the wording of the 
statute does not “evidence any concern with foreign enterprises, let alone 
a concern sufficiently clear to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.”139 On appeal, the Second Circuit declined to 
expressly endorse the enterprise-based reasoning, instead holding that 
 
 131. “It is unclear how Morrison’s logic, which evaluates the ‘focus’ of the relevant statute, 
precisely translates to RICO.” In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 132. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *5 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). 
 133. CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198–200 (D. Colo. 2011). 
 134. Cedeño v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 135. Id. at 472 (internal citations omitted). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 473. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. Plaintiffs also attempted to make a “predicate acts” argument, which the court ultimately 
rejected. Id. at 473–74. 
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under either the enterprise or predicate acts test the result would have 
been the same.140 
Other courts, however, have adopted the New York District Court’s 
enterprise-based reasoning.141 In 2011, the district court for the District 
of Columbia adopted the enterprise approach in United States v. Philip 
Morris.142 In a 2009 ruling before Morrison,143 the D.C. District Court 
found a group of defendants liable for RICO violations for conspiring to 
defraud American tobacco smokers, basing RICO liability on the 
scheme’s “tremendous impact on the United States.”144 BATCo, a Welsh 
tobacco company with its primary place of business in England, moved 
for reconsideration, arguing that its case be considered separately in light 
of the intervening ruling in Morrison.145 BATCo argued that Morrison 
“rejected the ‘effects’ test for extraterritoriality, thereby invalidating the 
basis for BATCo’s liability under RICO.”146 
The Philip Morris court agreed that Morrison invalidated the court’s 
previous holding.147 Looking to the extensive findings of fact in the 
underlying case, the court noted that the facts showed that BATCo’s 
enterprise was located abroad.148 Thus, Morrison invalidated the basis 
for the previous ruling against BATCo, which relied on the effects test.149 
Citing Cedeño, the court agreed that the text of the statute makes its 
focus on enterprises clear.150 
A California district court later followed this line of reasoning. The 
District Court for the Central District of California, in In re Toyota 
Motor Corp., considered the companion case to a large domestic multi-
district litigation brought following the highly publicized case dealing 
with the unintended acceleration of certain Toyota vehicles.151 Foreign 
plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the defendants had conspired to hide 
information about the unintended acceleration from foreign buyers, 
artificially inflating the value of their cars, and thus defrauded the foreign 
 
 140. Cedeño v. Castillo, 457 F. App’x 35, 38 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2011); In re 
Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. 
Fla. 2012); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 
2011); Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa, Inc., No. 8-299, 2012 WL 2093997 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2012); 
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 142. Philip Morris, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 28–29. 
 143. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 144. Id. at 873. 
 145. Philip Morris, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 26. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 29. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (citing Cedeño v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
 151. In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
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buyers.152 The Toyota court looked to Cedeño and “agree[d] in principle 
that ‘the focus of RICO is on the enterprise as the recipient of, or cover 
for, a pattern of criminal activity.’”153 
Interestingly, unlike the majority of other RICO extraterritoriality 
cases, the defendants in Toyota were located in the United States.154 The 
court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient factual 
allegations to invoke domestic RICO liability.155 However, the court left 
open the possibility for future foreign plaintiffs to bring a domestic 
RICO claim if they could adequately show that a domestic enterprise 
had economic effects abroad.156 The court noted that even if every other 
action occurred abroad (in this case, the “marketing, purchase, sale, or 
lease of Toyota vehicles”157), plaintiffs could still bring a successful 
RICO claim “as long as the enterprise, which engaged in a pattern of 
racketeering activity, operated domestically.”158 Thus, a RICO scheme 
planned out of the United States but put into effect internationally would 
still be covered by RICO. While the holding conforms to Morrison’s 
presumption against extraterritoriality, it leaves the door open for some 
limited extraterritorial application of RICO. This limited extraterritorial 
application would still be grounded in a domestic enterprise in keeping 
with the ruling in Morrison. 
In 2012, a Florida district court followed the enterprise approach in 
Sorota v. Sosa.159 The court specifically abrogated its 2008 holding in 
Liquidation Commission of Banco Intercontinental SA v. Renta because 
of the intervening Morrison ruling.160 In Renta, the Eleventh Circuit had 
applied the conduct and effects test to find RICO applicable to conduct 
aimed at defrauding a Dominican bank.161 The district court ultimately 
dismissed Sorota’s RICO claim: “The issue here is whether the 
extraterritoriality holding of Renta has been overruled—or, more 
accurately, undermined to the point of abrogation—by the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decision in Morrison . . . . Reluctantly, the Court 
 
 152. Id. at 897. 
 153. Id. at 914 (citing Cedeño, 733 F. Supp 2d at 474). 
 154. Id. at 896. 
 155. Id. at 914–15. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 915. 
 158. Id. (“[W]ere foreign Plaintiffs to bring a RICO claim against an alleged enterprise operating 
in the United States, consisting largely of domestic ‘persons,’ engaging in a pattern of racketeering 
activity in the United States, and damaging Plaintiffs abroad, these foreign Plaintiffs might well state a 
claim consistent with Morrison’s holding.”) 
 159. Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2012). 
 160. Id. at 1349. 
 161. Liquidation Comm’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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concludes that it has.”162 Following in the footsteps of Cedeño, Philip 
Morris, and Toyota, the court concluded that the focus of RICO was the 
enterprise, which in this case, was located in Peru.163 Citing those cases, 
the court further agreed RICO does not apply extraterritorially164 and 
dismissed Sorota’s claim. 
The enterprise approach crafted in Cedeño was made easier to 
apply with the addition of the “nerve center” test borrowed from 
corporate law.165 In European Community v. RJR Nabisco Inc., another 
New York district court held that the focus of RICO is on the enterprise, 
but noted the difficulty of determining the location of an enterprise.166 
The court then applied a nerve center test for determining the location of 
a RICO enterprise, a test borrowed from Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on determining the location of a corporation.167 The nerve center test 
focuses on the “brains” of the operation; the enterprise’s location is 
where the decisions effectuating the scheme are made.168 The addition of 
the nerve center test makes determining the location of an enterprise 
simpler. Additionally, the enterprise test has enjoyed support from other 
commentators because of its clarity and the ease with which lower courts 
can apply it.169 
The only circuit court to apply anything like an enterprise test was 
the Second Circuit in Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc. That 
court decided Norex just three months after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Morrison.170 Morrison essentially invalidated appellant’s 
arguments on appeal. The Norex court sidestepped the issue of RICO’s 
focus, holding that under any focus, RICO extraterritorial reach did not 
cover the defendants.171 
 
 162. Sorota, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1348–49 (internal citations omitted). Renta applied the conduct and 
effects test and held that enough of the defendant’s conduct had occurred in the United States for 
RICO to apply. Renta, 530 F.3d at 1352. 
 163. Sorota, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1349–50. 
 164. Id. at 1349. 
 165. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). The “enterprise” approach was also followed by a federal district court in 
Pennsylvania. In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., 9-MC-162, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011); 
Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. v. Alcoa, Inc., Civ. Action No. 8-299, 2012 WL 2093997, at *2–6 (W.D. Pa. 
June 11, 2012). Additionally, the “enterprise” plus “nerve center” approach was followed by a California 
federal court in O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Seamaster Logistics, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 940 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 166. RJR Nabisco, 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at *6. 
 169. See, e.g., Leonard & Rodriguez-Albizu, supra note 115, at 63.  
 170. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 171. Id. 
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B. The Predicate Acts Approach 
Two other court decisions since Morrison have determined that 
RICO’s focus is not on “enterprises,” but is instead on the “predicate 
acts” that form the pattern of racketeering activity. In CGC Holding Co., 
LLC v. Hutchens, the District of Colorado determined that RICO’s focus 
was on the acts and conduct that made up the RICO scheme.172 The 
Southern District of New York followed this approach in Chevron Corp. 
v. Donziger because the court felt the new approach better exemplified 
congressional intent in crafting RICO.173 However, some commentators 
have called the predicate acts approach “merely a reincarnation of the 
‘conducts’ and ‘effects’ test that the Supreme Court expressly rejected 
in Morrison.”174 
In CGC Holding Co., the court considered allegations that 
Hutchens, a Canadian resident and citizen, had orchestrated a phony 
loan scheme based in Canada to defraud American plaintiffs.175 The 
plaintiffs brought RICO allegations in Colorado against the Canadian 
defendants and the “loan” companies, and the defendants moved to 
dismiss on the grounds that RICO has no extraterritorial applicability.176 
The court agreed with the Cedeño line of cases that, “RICO 
provides no indication of an extraterritorial application.”177 The court 
disagreed, however, with the determination of the focus of RICO. The 
court instead determined that RICO’s focus was on the predicate acts: 
“The focus of the statute is the racketeering activity, i.e., to render 
unlawful a pattern of domestic racketeering activity perpetrated by an 
enterprise.”178 Although the enterprise was essentially organized and run 
in Canada, the court determined that “the conduct of the enterprise 
within the United States was a key to its success.”179 Thus, the Hutchens 
court crafted a new test that looks not to the location of the enterprise, 
but instead to where the predicate acts of racketeering occurred. The 
court focused on the defendants’ conduct and effects that occurred in the 
United States, essentially crafting a new test based on the rationale that 
had already been rejected in Morrison. 
In 2012, another court followed the faulty logic from Hutchens. In 
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, the same court that crafted the enterprise 
test in Cedeño two years earlier rejected the enterprise-based reasoning 
from that line of cases, instead following the “predicate acts” reasoning 
 
 172. CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (D. Colo. 2011). 
 173. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 174. Leonard & Rodriguez-Albizu, supra note 115, at 63. 
 175. CGC Holding Co., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1200–01. 
 176. Id. at 1197. 
 177. Id. at 1208. 
 178. Id. at 1209 (emphasis in original). 
 179. Id. at 1210. 
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from Hutchens.180 The court considered extraterritorial RICO claims 
stemming from a massive judicial settlement against Chevron in 
Ecuador.181 Chevron alleged that Steven Donziger, a New York lawyer 
associated with the case, extorted and defrauded the company from his 
New York office.182 Donziger moved to dismiss on the basis that it was 
an impermissible attempt to apply RICO extraterritorially.183 
The Donziger court was, of course, not bound by Cedeño, and no 
appellate court above it had (nor has) weighed in on the correct test for 
determining extraterritorial RICO claims. After examining the reasoning 
used in Cedeño (and noting the other cases that followed it), the court 
found that its emphasis on the domestic or foreign “enterprise” of a 
RICO claim was not “persuasive or helpful” because only domestic 
enterprises would be covered.184 The court focused on the perceived 
inequality of applying RICO to domestic enterprises alone, leaving 
international enterprises untouched.185 Applying the Hutchens 
reasoning, the court concluded that RICO was unavailable because the 
alleged predicate acts had occurred in the United States, and denied 
Donziger’s motion to dismiss.186 The obvious flaw in the Donziger court’s 
reasoning is the well-established presumption that Congress “ordinarily 
legislates with domestic effect”; if Congress wishes its laws to have 
foreign effect it must specifically say so.187 RICO has no such specific 
intent, so courts must only apply RICO to domestic enterprises, leaving 
foreign and international enterprises beyond RICO’s reach. 
 
 180. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 181. Id. at 236. 
 182. Id. at 240 (Donziger was accused of “(1) bringing a lawsuit in Ecuador; (2) fabricating 
(principally in the United States) evidence for use in that lawsuit in order to obtain an unwarranted 
judgment there; (3) exerting pressure on Chevron to coerce it to pay money not only by means of the 
Ecuadorian litigation and judgment, but also by subjecting Chevron to public attacks in the United 
States and elsewhere based on false and misleading statements; (4) inducing U.S. public officials to 
investigate Chevron; and (5) making false statements to U.S. courts and intimidating and tampering 
with witnesses in U.S. court proceedings to cover up their improper activities.”). 
 183. Id. at 239. 
 184. Id. at 241. 
 185. Id. at 243. 
 186. Id. The “predicate acts” line of reasoning has been followed in at least two other cases. In 
2012, an Illinois district court analyzed both the “enterprise” and “predicate acts” lines of cases in 
Borich v. BP, P.L.C., and concluded that it was persuaded by the “predicate acts” reasoning. 
904 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Ill. 2012). In 2013, in Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, the Southern District of 
New York—the same court that issued both the Cedeño and Donziger decisions—noted the inability 
of the court to decide on the correct approach: “The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
not yet determined the objects of the RICO statute’s solicitude . . . . The district judges in this Circuit 
have not reached agreement on the issue, either.” Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F. Supp. 2d 517, 
544 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The court ultimately declined to decide the issue, holding that under either 
approach the plaintiffs were seeking an inappropriate extraterritorial application of RICO, and 
dismissed the claim. Id. at 552. 
 187. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
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A minority of courts have rejected the enterprise approach, opting, 
instead, to use a predicate acts approach that looks to the location of the 
alleged acts and activities. This test is essentially a re-working of the 
conduct and effects test, a test invalidated by Morrison. The Donziger 
court based its reasoning on a flawed understanding of a basic concept of 
statutory interpretation—the presumption against extraterritoriality. In 
2013, the Ninth Circuit crafted a third approach. 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s New Approach in UNITED STATES v. CHAO FAN 
XU 
In 2013, the Ninth Circuit identified a third method of interpreting 
RICO’s extraterritorial application, focusing on the “pattern of 
activity.”188 The test creates the possibility that RICO may be applicable 
to some conduct that occurs abroad so long as enough of the acts in the 
“pattern” occurred in the United States.189 In Chao Fan Xu, the court 
considered a “multinational” RICO scheme aimed at defrauding 
international banks, in which some conduct occurred in the United 
States.190 The court focused on the defendant’s conduct as a whole, 
regarding the entire set of actions as a “pattern” under RICO.191 This 
ruling created a third approach, which only muddies the already unclear 
waters of RICO’s extraterritorial effect. 
In Chao Fan Xu, four Chinese nationals appealed their RICO 
convictions for crimes committed as part of a scheme to defraud the 
Bank of China.192 The four defendants were two couples who legally 
married in China.193 The husbands were both managers at the Kaiping 
sub-branch of the Bank of China.194 From 1994 to 2001, they allegedly 
engaged in three types of fraud to funnel money out of the bank and into 
a conduit company: foreign exchange speculation, out-of-book 
unrecorded loans, and false loans.195 The fraudulent conduct resulted in a 
total loss of around $420 million.196 According to the charges, the 
defendants avoided detection by falsifying bank records, even though the 
Chinese government audited the bank.197 
To avoid Chinese law enforcement in the event the fraud was ever 
discovered, all four defendants entered into allegedly false marriages 
 
 188. United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 189. Id. at 978. 
 190. Id. at 972–73. 
 191. Id. at 978–79. 
 192. Id. at 972. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 973. 
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with American residents who held valid U.S. residency.198 The purpose 
of the marriages was to gain U.S. passports and residency status because 
China does not have an extradition treaty with the United States. As 
such, the fraudulently acquired passports would aid the defendants in 
avoiding prosecution in China.199 The defendants used their fraudulently 
acquired passports to travel to the United States, where they funneled 
their stolen funds through Las Vegas casinos and into personal accounts 
for their own use at American banks.200 
In 2001, when the Bank of China finally changed its accounting 
procedures and discovered the fraud, the defendants fled to the United 
States using their fraudulent passports and immigration status.201 Federal 
officials arrested a fifth conspirator in Los Angeles who informed them 
of the entirety of the scheme.202 The federal officials then arrested the 
defendants in Kansas and Oklahoma in 2004 and eventually convicted 
them of RICO conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, conspiracy to 
transport stolen money, and use of fraudulently obtained passports and 
visas.203 The defendants appealed the conviction on the grounds that 
their RICO convictions were invalid because their crimes were 
committed in China and RICO cannot be applied extraterritorially.204 
The defendants based their appeal on the theory that their enterprise 
had two parts: part one, the conspiracy, which occurred in China; and 
part two, the immigration fraud, which occurred in the United States.205 
The court noted at the outset of its opinion that it was 
“consider[ing] RICO’s application in a multinational context,”206 and 
that it was necessary to determine whether RICO could be lawfully 
applied to any, or all, of the defendant’s foreign conduct.207 The court 
then turned to the tests crafted by previous courts. Looking at the 
analysis in the Cedeño line of cases, the court acknowledged that the 
cases “concluded that the focus of RICO is on the enterprise—
specifically, domestic enterprises.”208 The court also examined the “nerve 
center” test used in European Community and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines 
before rejecting it along with the enterprise approach because it targeted 
only one aspect of the conspiracy.209  
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 973–74. 
 204. Id. at 974. 
 205. Id. at 975. 
 206. Id. at 974. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 976. 
 209. Id. at 977. 
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The Chao Fan Xu court addressed the “predicate acts that form a 
pattern of racketeering activity” approach and found this approach to be 
more convincing.210 However, the court focused more on the “pattern of 
activity” language and ultimately settled on a new test.211 The court 
looked to previous Supreme Court cases to determine that the focus of 
RICO is the pattern of activity.212 The court also looked to RICO’s 
legislative history and noted that Congress passed the law to impose new 
sanctions on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized 
crime.213 The court determined that “it is highly unlikely that Congress 
was unconcerned with the actions of foreign enterprises where those 
actions violated the laws of this country while the defendants were in this 
country.”214 Therefore, the court decided that it should look “at the 
pattern of defendants’ racketeering activity taken as a whole.”215 This 
reasoning ignores the presumption against extraterritoriality and chooses 
to include foreign actions where the presumption should otherwise shut 
them out. 
In applying the pattern of activity test to this case, the court 
reasoned that the entirety of the defendant’s action should be taken into 
account: 
The dual parts of Defendants’ enterprise were necessarily conjoined in 
pursuit of that goal—i.e., to steal large sums of money from the Bank 
of China and to get away with it in the United States. Defendants 
intended to use the immigration fraud to consummate the purpose of 
the enterprise: to acquire the money and safely enjoy it in the United 
States, beyond the reach of Chinese law. Without the immigration 
fraud, the bank fraud would have been a dangerous failure.216 
Thus, while the court based its affirmation of the RICO conviction 
on the defendant’s domestic immigration fraud, it considered the pattern 
of activity as a whole, including predicate acts perpetrated abroad.217 The 
court essentially affirmed that RICO has no extraterritorial application218 
and then applied the law to a pattern of activity that took place 
abroad.219 This created a new, entirely unnecessary approach that is 
counter to the well-established presumption against extraterritoriality. 
The new focus, while borrowing language from previous cases that used 
the predicate acts approach, leaves more room for extraterritorial 
 
 210. Id. at 975–79. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id.; see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987); 
H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989). 
 213. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 978. 
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 978–79. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 978. 
 219. Id. at 979. 
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applicability than the other two tests. If Congress wanted RICO to have 
extraterritorial effect, it would (and is indeed required to) have 
specifically stated so. The Ninth Circuit has attempted to circumvent 
basic concepts in statutory interpretation and give RICO an 
extraterritorial effect Congress never meant it to have. 
IV.  CEDEÑO’s “Enterprise” Approach is the Clearest and Most 
Easily Applied Approach 
The Ninth Circuit ruling unnecessarily muddied the waters of 
RICO’s extraterritorial applicability. The ruling crafted a third possible 
approach to RICO extraterritoriality, which will be difficult for lower 
courts to apply. The enterprise approach crafted in Cedeño is a clearer 
test that already enjoys a high level of support in the lower courts, and 
should be adopted by appellate courts going forward.  
The enterprise approach looks to the location of the RICO scheme, 
where the “brains” of the operation were located. Coupled with the 
nerve center test applied in European Community v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 
this approach cuts RICO’s extraterritorial application along clear lines: 
RICO applies to enterprises located in the United States, but not to 
enterprises located abroad. The predicate acts approach is simply a 
reworking of the invalid conduct and effects test and is counter to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. 
The major problem with the Chao Fan Xu ruling is the lack of 
clarity concerning the line between domestic and foreign patterns of 
activity.220 The Ninth Circuit would likely not have settled on a pattern of 
activity approach if the contacts with the United States were significantly 
less than they were in Chao Fan Xu, but the court provides no guidance 
as to how much of the pattern of activity need take place in the United 
States for a court to find that the entire pattern and predicate acts 
occurred domestically. Under the Ninth Circuit’s test, courts will still be 
able to find that some foreign acts constitute a pattern. What the court 
left unclear, however, is how much of the activity must take place in, or 
have a connection with, the United States for the entire pattern, foreign 
acts included, to be considered domestic. This leaves courts in the Ninth 
Circuit with a largely open-ended test likely to create wildly different 
results in different courtrooms. The lack of a clear test in the Second 
Circuit is similarly concerning, although far more courts in the Second 
Circuit have endorsed the enterprise approach. 
A better alternative is the enterprise test crafted in Cedeño. This 
test focuses simply on the location of the enterprise, essentially where the 
 
 220. The Donziger court made a similar argument about the “enterprise” approach coupled with 
the “nerve center” test, but this argument is unpersuasive because that court ignored the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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“brains” of the scheme are located.221 The approach is also consistent 
with the presumption against extraterritoriality, as it only covers schemes 
with enterprises located within the United States. It is clear that 
Congress intended enterprises to be a focus of RICO, as enterprises are 
listed in the very wording of the statute as an element of the crimes 
covered.222 “Enterprises” are defined in the statute using the plain 
meaning, but “patterns of activity” are only defined as requiring “two or 
more acts” without any further clarification of what makes a “pattern.”223 
The enterprise approach leaves no need to divine legislative intent any 
further, as the courts using the predicate acts and pattern of activity 
approaches have done. Additionally, the enterprise approach leaves the 
statute with no, or almost no, extraterritorial application, which is in 
keeping with the presumption against extraterritoriality and Congress’s 
presumed focus on domestic affairs.224 Note that the Toyota court left 
open the possibility for foreign plaintiffs to bring a successful RICO suit 
if the enterprise is domestic but its effects are felt abroad.225 A foreign 
plaintiff could bring an extraterritorial RICO claim if the scheme was 
hatched in the United States but every other aspect occurred abroad.226 
This possibility is still consistent with congressional intent that RICO 
have domestic effect—a RICO enterprise planned in the United States 
should be punishable under U.S. law. On the other hand, a foreign 
enterprise should be beyond RICO’s reach. 
One valid criticism of the enterprise approach is the difficulty of 
determining the locus of the enterprise. However, the European 
Community court provided a straightforward approach borrowed from 
Supreme Court jurisprudence: the nerve center test.227 This test looks to 
where the “brains” of an operation were located, as opposed to its 
“brawn,” or where the acts were carried out.228 Because of district courts’ 
familiarity with the nerve center test, it should be relatively easy to 
apply.229 Additionally, because of its clarity, the enterprise approach and 
the nerve center test are likely to produce similar results across 
jurisdictions, leading to relative stability in RICO extraterritoriality 
jurisprudence. 
 
 221. See Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95 (2010); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-
5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011). 
 222. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)–(c) (2012). 
 223. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)–(5) (2012). 
 224. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 225. In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 226. Id. 
 227. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 NGG VVP, 2011 WL 843957, at *5–6 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011); see Hertz v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 78 (2010). 
 228. RJR Nabisco, 2011 WL 843957, at *6. 
 229. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 90. 
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Conclusion 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison, courts 
considering the extraterritorial reach of RICO borrowed the conduct and 
effects test established by the Second Circuit securities jurisprudence. 
The Morrison ruling expressly invalidated that test and mandated that 
courts look to the “focus” of each statute to divine its extraterritorial 
application. After Morrison, lower courts have struggled to apply the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning to cases implicating extraterritorial 
applications of RICO. Over the past several years, three foci for RICO 
have emerged in determining RICO’s applicability to acts occurring 
abroad: the location of the enterprise, predicate acts, and the pattern of 
activity. Due to the weaknesses inherent in the predicate acts and pattern 
of activity approaches, courts should apply the enterprise approach 
moving forward.  
The predicate acts approach is flawed because it is simply a 
refabricated version of the conduct and effects test, which was 
invalidated by Morrison. This approach also ignores the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Further, the test is designed to treat 
enterprises that are located abroad and those that are located 
domestically the same. That concept flies in the face of the presumption 
because it gives an extraterritorial reach to RICO where Congress has 
not specified that the statute should have any extraterritorial reach. 
The pattern of activity approach is also flawed. It similarly ignores 
the presumption against extraterritoriality by attempting to extend 
RICO to multinational schemes where Congress has not given the statute 
any international effect. Congress can mandate that its laws have 
extraterritorial effect, but it has not done so with RICO. The pattern of 
activity approach is an unnecessary version of an already flawed 
predicate acts approach. 
Future courts should adopt the enterprise test for RICO 
extraterritoriality because it is the easiest approach for lower courts to 
apply. The enterprise test creates clear lines for RICO’s extraterritorial 
applicability: an enterprise located in the United States is covered, but an 
enterprise located abroad is not. The addition of the nerve center test 
makes locating the enterprise especially clear, as it requires courts to 
engage in the common inquiry of where the brains of the scheme were 
located—that is, where defendants made decisions and coordinated their 
operation. The enterprise approach is also the test most likely to produce 
predictable results because of its clarity, and it enjoys the widest amount 
of support among courts. Lastly, the enterprise approach is consistent 
with both the presumption against extraterritoriality and congressional 
intent in passing RICO. 
 
